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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of same-sex marriage poses difficult questions for America in
the moral, ethical, and legal realms of society. This controversial issue has
proven to be capable of dividing the country.' With the wave of recent legal
developments concerning the recognition of same-sex unions, the future of the
law is very much in doubt. America is in a period of constant flux with regard
to gay rights. Questions remain as to how this issue will develop in the courts,
legislature, and the private sector alike.
Upon objectively analyzing the many credible arguments for and
against legal recognition of same-sex unions, legal acceptance emerges as the
just answer. This Article examines the compelling support for this conclusion in
detail, claiming that the totality and legitimacy of arguments supporting equal
rights represents overwhelming evidence that acceptance is the optimal solution.
The "acceptance" endorsed in this Article need not necessarily come from judi-
cial intervention; this is but one scenario in a variety of options explored. In-
stead, the focus is on logical ends rather than often divisive means.
Compelling arguments supporting equal rights for same-sex couples ex-
ist in many areas of the law. Most notably, the Bill of Rights, by intensely pro-
tecting civil liberties, provides the most persuasive and credible support through
the Equal Protection Clause,2 the Due Process Clause,3 and the Establishment
Clause. 4 Individually and collectively, these principles show that the Constitu-
tion supports equal rights for same-sex couples. Beyond the Constitution, justi-
fications for equal rights exist in subjects such as morality, religion, and eco-
nomic theory, to name a few. Most importantly, acceptance of equal rights for
homosexuals embodies the ultimate values and principles that are the corner-
stone of this country: freedom and liberty.
This Article approaches same-sex marriage from many different angles.
Numerous articles advocate a single method to obtain equal rights,5 but few
provide multiple options or discuss the interconnectedness of different ap-
I See Greg Hitt, Voters Mostly Voice Opposition to Gay Marriage, THE WALL STREET
JOURNAL, November 3, 2004, at A5. See also Stephen A. Newman, The Use and Abuse of Social
Science in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 537, 537-38 (2005); infra
notes 190-193 and accompanying text. See generally Josephine Ross, Sex, Marriage and History:
Analyzing the Continued Resistance to Same-Sex Marriage, 55 SMU L. REV. 1657 (2002).
2 U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
3 Id.
4 U.S. CONST. amend I.
5 See generally Mark Strasser, Loving in the New Millenium: On Equal Protection and the
Right to Marry, 7 U. CI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 61 (2000); Marc L. Rubinstein, Gay Rights and
Religion: A Doctrinal Approach to the Argument that Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives Violate the
Establishment Clause, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1585 (1995).
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proaches. Because of this cross-sectional analysis, brief and succinct arguments
are appropriate.6
Additionally, this Article operates on the premise that there are two
common conflicts implicit with the issue of same-sex marriage: 1) the struggle
for equal rights of marriage (the benefits of marriage); and 2) the struggle for
the institution of marriage.7 Because of this premise, and in the interest of brev-
ity, the focus herein is on the equal rights side of the equation. 8 Viewing this
Article in that light not only helps explain the rights-oriented position that is
endorsed, but also encourages the reader to draw their own conclusions about
the significance of a single word in the larger debate. Fittingly, the permanent
solution endorsed near the conclusion embraces the dual nature of the problem
by proposing a compromise. It ultimately seeks to avoid conflict over the insti-
tution of marriage altogether.
Part II provides background on gay rights by explaining the current state
of rights and by highlighting recent developments in the United States. Part III
describes ways homosexual couples are discriminated against by identifying the
rights that these couples are denied. Part IV represents the heart of the analysis,
and provides detailed legal rationales reflecting that same-sex couples should be
granted equal rights under the law. 9 Primarily, this Part claims that the recent
wave of legislation specifically forbidding legal recognition of same-sex unions
is transparently unconstitutional in the eyes of precedent. Secondarily, this Part
claims that beyond the constitutionality of civil union bans, equal rights for
same-sex couples are guaranteed under the Constitution.
Part V refutes legal arguments against equal rights for same-sex cou-
ples. Part VI explores compelling policy reasons to move towards equal rights,
touching on moral, religious, and economic principles. These policy arguments
help lead to the logical conclusion that, even if the Supreme Court decides that
equal rights for same-sex couples are not technically mandated by the Constitu-
6 Indeed, lengthy individual essays could be written on most of the issues explored in this
Article, and much of the cited material provides further clarification and discussion.
7 See generally David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call it Marriage": The First Amendment and
Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925 (2001) (documenting the dualistic
nature of the issue of same-sex marriage).
8 In other words, this examination of same-sex unions takes a rights-oriented approach and
downplays the issue of whether or not homosexual couples should have co-ownership of the word
"marriage." Instead, this Article focuses on the constitutional argument that homosexual couples
should be afforded every one of those legal rights that are implicit in traditional marriage. There-
fore, unless otherwise stated, the word "marriage" is used to represent legal rights implicit with
heterosexual marriage, and not necessarily co-ownership of that word. Using the words "civil
unions," or "domestic partnerships" is not preferable in this arrangement because the real world
application of these terms typically does not represent all of the rights of marriage. See infra
notes 10-13 and accompanying text. Much has been discussed concerning the significance of
changing the definition of marriage, and the impact that this would have on the psyche of Amer-
ica. See Cruz, supra note 7.
9 The Equal Protection Clause, Due Process Clause, Establishment Clause, and constitutional
interpretation are among the legal issues explored in this Section.
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tion, equal rights are good for society. Lastly, Part VII endorses an unexplored
compromise to the current stand-off that is capable of enduring constitutional
scrutiny and allows all sides to claim victory.
II. CURRENT LEGAL STATUS AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A broader perspective of same-sex marriage shows how other nations
are dealing with this complex issue. Around the world, the current legal state of
gay rights is extremely varied. In Europe, homosexuality has gained stronger
acceptance than in other parts of the world.' ° The following table illustrates the
current international acceptance level of same-sex unions."
Countries Rights Obtained Year
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, "Registered 1989, 1993, 1995,
Iceland, Finland Partnerships" 1 2  1996, 2002
Hungary, France, Germany, "Same-Sex Unions" 13  1998, 1999, 2000,
Portugal 2001
Canada, Netherlands, Bel- "Same-Sex Marriages" 14 1999, 2001, 2003,
gium, Spain _ 2005
These facts show that over the last twenty years, other parts of the west-
ern world have steadily recognized the importance of providing equal rights to
homosexuals. This indicates an international movement towards rights for
same-sex couples; an "emerging awareness" 15 that same-sex unions are deserv-
ing of legal protection.
10 Harvard Law Association, Inching Down the Aisle: Differing Paths Toward the Legaliza-
tion of Same-Sex Marriage in the United States and Europe, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2004, 2007
(2003).
11 Id. at 2007-08. The entire chart (other than the information on Canada and Spain) was
comprised of information obtained from the Harvard Law Review.
12 Id. at 2008. These "registered partnerships" include most, but not all rights of heterosexual
marriage. Id.
13 Id. The "same-sex unions" noted above grant fewer rights than "registered partnerships." Id.
14 Canada: the passage of the Civil Marriage Act in July 2005 made same-sex marriages legal
throughout Canada. Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, Same-Sex Marriage in Canada,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-sex-marriage-inCanada (last visited Sept. 24, 2005). The
Canadian judiciary began steadily granting marriage rights to same-sex couples beginning in 1999
before the legislature passed the Civil Marriage Act. Id. Netherlands: became the first nation to
ensure all rights of marriage to same-sex couples. See Harvard Law Association, supra note 10.
Belgium: despite having rights to same-sex marriage, these couples do not have adoption rights.
Id. Spain: during the summer of 2005, Spanish MPs voted in favor of allowing gay couples to
both marry and adopt children. See Gay Marriage Around the Globe,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4081999.stm (last visited Aug. 18, 2005).
15 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). Though this term was used by the Supreme
Court in the context of private sexual conduct, the analogy can be made to same-sex marriage. Id.
[Vol. 108
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In the United States, the level of legal acceptance for homosexuals has
been in constant flux during the last fifteen years.1 6 In one of the more signifi-
cant developments, the Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA"), was signed into
law during President Bill Clinton's first term. 17 DOMA not only defines mar-
riage as a union between a man and a woman for federal purposes, but it also
discretely allows any state to refuse the recognition of any "right or claim" of a
same-sex couple "arising from such relationship."' 8  This second aspect of
DOMA has a more drastic impact on equal rights, making it clear that, no matter
what the circumstances, states are not obliged to give same-sex couples any
legal rights. 19
Following the setback of DOMA, there has been progress towards equal
rights, most notably taking place in the judiciary. The Supreme Court opinions
of Romer v. Evans 2 0 and Lawrence v. Texas2 1 presented homosexuals with pre-
viously elusive judicial protection. Vermont became the first state to recognize
civil unions in 1999.22 In 2003, Massachusetts went even further by becoming
the only state to recognize same-sex marriages.23 These strides have helped
bring the issue of same-sex marriage to the forefront of American politics.
24
16 See Harvard Law Association, supra note 10.
17 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) [hereinafter DOMA].
No lavish signing ceremony took place, as it was signed at 12:50 a.m. on September 21, 1996, less
than six weeks before a hotly contested presidential election. James M. Donovan, DOMA: An
Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist Christianity, 4 MICH J. GENDER & L. 335, 336
(1997). This circumstantial evidence can lead readers to their own conclusion regarding the poli-
tics surrounding its passage.
18 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000). "No State... shall be required to give effect to any public act..
. respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage under the
laws of such other State ... or a right or claim arising from such relationship ...." (emphasis
added). This authorization for states to ignore the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution
is another aspect of the law that is constitutionally suspect. Donovan, supra note 17, at 337.
19 It is undisputed that the possible effects of DOMA are far-reaching. Donovan, supra note
17, at 337. However, despite DOMA's notoriety, the effects thus far have largely been symbolic,
and it is rarely the subject of litigation. Nonetheless, in one of its first legal challenges in a bank-
ruptcy hearing, it survived rational basis, citing procreation and child-rearing as legitimate state
interests. See In Re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
20 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Romer marked the first time that homosexuals were protected under
the Equal Protection Clause. Id. This case is discussed in great detail in Part IV.
21 539 U.S. 558 (2003). As a result of Lawrence, consensual homosexual conduct can no
longer be criminalized. Id. This case is discussed in great detail in Part IV.
22 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
23 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). See also Wikipedia, the
Free Encyclopedia, Same-Sex Marriage in the United States, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-
sexmarriagej_intheUnited_States (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
24 Other courtroom progress occurred in places like Hawaii and Alaska. See Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct.
1998). Additionally, in what many consider to have been more an act of civil disobedience than
true legal progress, San Francisco began issuing marriage licenses for same-sex couples in Febru-
ary of 2004. California High Court Voids Same-Sex Marriages, Aug. 13, 2004,
2005]
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Subsequent to these courtroom developments, the 2004 elections deliv-
ered a tough blow to the momentum that the gay rights movement had
achieved. 25 Through these elections, eleven states26 banned same-sex marriage,
and eight of those also banned civil unions.27 Even in Oregon, considered a
progressive state,28 a ban was passed. 9 Perhaps the only favorable election re-
sult came from Cincinnati, Ohio, where voters chose to repeal a 1993 measure
that precluded homosexuals from receiving rights and protections based on their
status. 30 Soon after the 2004 national election, the California legislature became
the first one in the country to approve a bill permitting same-sex marriages.31
After observing the volatility of this issue over the last several years,
questions remain as to what the next developments will be. How will each side
fight for public opinion? Will the wave of state constitutional amendments sur-
vive judicial challenge? And, most importantly, what is the next step?
1I1. IDENTIFYING THE RIGHTS AT STAKE
The following question is the starting point in addressing the issue of
same-sex marriage: How are gay and lesbian couples discriminated against by
not being able to form a legal union?32 This legitimate question must be an-
swered in order to challenge the current laws. Without injury (here in the form
of unequal treatment), same-sex couples would not have standing to bring suit.
33
http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/08/12/same-sex.marriage/index.html. These marriages in San
Francisco were later held to be void. Id.
25 See Hitt, supra note 1.
26 Id. The eleven states that banned same-sex marriage are Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Oregon, and Utah. Id.
27 A civil union is defined as "a legally recognized and voluntary union of adult parties of the
same sex." Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=Civil %20union (last visited
July 28, 2005).
28 In Oregon, an amendment to preclude gays from getting special rights was previously de-
feated by the voting public. See the failed initiative at Measure 9,
http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/nov72000/guide/mea/m9/m9.htm (last visited Feb. 6, 2005).
29 See Hitt, supra note 1.
30 Corey Moss, Gay-Rights Groups Hope Courts Will Overturn Marriage Bans,
http://www.mtv.com/chooseorlose/headlines/news.jhtml?id=1493459 (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
The original measure passed in 1993 was similar in nature to the measure that was struck down in
Romer. Id.
31 California Legislature Approves Gay Marriage, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,168643,00.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2005). This measure remained subject to veto by
Governor Schwarzenegger at the time of publication. Id.
32 West Virginia Equal Rights Forum at the West Virginia University College of Law (Oct. 18,
2004).
33 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). Standing is proved by 1) injury
in fact; 2) causation; and 3) redressibility. Id.
[Vol. 108
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The following is a summarized list of the many rights that homosexual couples




* Visitation Rights in Hospital Situations
36
* Notification Rights Upon Death or Injury to a Partner
37
Financial Privileges and Property Rights
38
" Joint Tax Returns
39
* Rights in Bankruptcy Proceedings4°
" Inheritance Rights
41
34 The rights at stake are not limited to these brief lists, and these lists emphasize those rights
obtained through heterosexual marriage.
35 These are perhaps the rights that even a minimal level of compassion would yield to - re-
gardless of belief in the righteousness of homosexuality. Much common ground is possible with
these rights. See generally Emily Taylor, Across the Board: The Dismantling of Marriage in
Favor of Universal Civil Union Laws, 28 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 171 (2001).
36 Id. If a partner in a same-sex relationship is killed or hospitalized, the other partner will not
be notified and may have trouble obtaining vital information. The following is a harsh example of
this reality:
In 1983, Sharon Kowalski was almost killed in a car wreck, and her lifetime
partner, Karen Thompson, who arrived at the hospital long before anyone else,
was not even allowed to inquire about her condition. She was refused any an-
swers because the hospital did not consider her a family member, despite the
fact that Karen probably knew Sharon better than anyone else. Not until many
hours later, when Sharon's parents arrived, did Karen learn that her partner
would be disabled for the rest of her life. Following, Sharon's parents, with the
help of a court, precluded Karen from visitation because a legal relationship be-
tween them was nonexistent.
Id. at 173 n.13 (citations omitted).
37 Id.
38 Some of these financial rights can be established through alternative means (such as contract
law, employer initiative, etc.), but many of these alternatives take time, money, and are vulnerable
to defeat.
39 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (2003). This case is the infamous
Massachusetts Supreme Court case that granted homosexuals the right to marry. The rights cited
from that case, though relevant to Massachusetts, symbolize the categories of rights denied to
homosexual couples in other states across America, as well as those rights denied by the federal
government. Id.
40 See generally A. Mechele Dickerson, Family Values and the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal
to Eliminate Bankruptcy Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 69
(1998). Many states structure their homestead exemptions to "heads of households," for which
homosexual couples usually cannot qualify. Id. This means that homosexual couples are much
more likely to lose their home in the event of a bankruptcy. Id.
41 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955. Examples of inheritance rights that same-sex couples do not
have are rights implicit in intestate succession and elective share. Id. Intestate succession rights
are automatic inheritance rights when a spouse does not leave a will. Elective share gives the
2005]
7
Pasfield: Confronting America's Ambivalence towards Same-Sex Marriage: A Le
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
* Insurance and Benefits Coverage42
* Property Rights
43
* Rights in Divorce 4
Non-Financial Rights
* Spousal Privilege for Testimony in Court 45
" Social Recognition 46
" Expression of Marriage
47
" Freedom from Mental Anguish and Peace of Mind
48
This general list does not illustrate the full magnitude of the rights at
stake. The U.S. General Accounting Office has identified 1,138 federal rights
that are given to couples based on marital status alone. 49 Explaining each of
these rights individually is beyond the scope of this Article. Additionally, an
important right not listed above is perhaps the most compelling: children's
rights in same-sex households.5°
surviving spouse certain property rights when the deceased spouse has not provided for them in
their will. Id.
42 Charles R. P. Pouncy, Marriage and Domestic Partnership: Rationality and Inequality, 7
TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 363, 366 (1998). Examples of these are retirement benefits and
health care. Id.
43 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955. These rights are often intertwined with inheritance
rights. An example of this is when a same sex couple lives together for 30 years and one dies
without a will. The family of the deceased gets priority over all of the property before the surviv-
ing partner does. Id.
44 Id. at 956. Divorce rights include alimony, child support, and equitable division of marital
property upon divorce. Id. Because same-sex couples cannot marry, the default laws that govern
divorces are not available to them.
45 JACK B. WEINSTEIN AND MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE MANUAL § 18.05[1]
(6th ed. 2003). Though these rules vary from state to state, spouses typically possess a right to
refuse to testify against their spouse. This rule is contained in Supreme Court Standard 505. Id.
West Virginia's spousal privilege rules are contained in W. VA. CODE § 57-3-3 to -4 (2000).
46 See Pouncy, supra note 42.
47 See Cruz, supra note 7 at 928-29. Same-sex couples are denied the "unique expressive
resource that is civil marriage." Id.
48 See Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions Law,
Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113 (2000). Failure to recog-
nize same-sex marriages can arguably place a "'badge of inferiority"' on the couples involved. A
legal union also affords its participants protections (many listed above) that lead to peace of mind
and security for those involved. Id.
49 Letter from American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers to Author 2 (Nov. 10, 2004) (on
file with the West Virginia Law Review). Another source identifies 1,049 rights. See Same-Sex
Marriage in the United States, supra note 23.
50 See Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: Justifying Same-Sex Marriage from the
Perspective of a Child of the Union, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 411 (1999). This issue is explored sepa-
rately in Part VI, and as such, description of the rights of children is relegated to that point.
[Vol. 108
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Nevertheless, understanding the general nature of the rights at stake is
very important in making the case for acceptance. The sheer quantity and mag-
nitude of those rights listed above is striking and can be persuasive in and of
itself. Even many that disagree with homosexuality or same-sex marriage may
be inclined to provide a minimum level of protection to homosexual couples for
pragmatic reasons.51 Simply, articulating these rights denied is the first step in
forming a constitutional challenge. It can also be the first step in convincing
people that homosexual couples should not be deprived of these rights.
IV. LEGAL SUPPORT FOR EQUAL RIGHTS
The following analysis explores the current status of Supreme Court
precedent, explains the significance of a principled approach, and illustrates
several constitutional arguments that may appear before the Court. For the sake
of simplicity, this Section is organized by the following constitutional issues:
constitutional interpretation, the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process
Clause, the Establishment Clause, and the "forgotten" Ninth Amendment.
A. Constitutional Interpretation
An effective analysis of the legal arguments for same-sex marriage re-
quires a principled approach to the Constitution. Such an approach views the
Constitution, and, more specifically, the Bill of Rights, as a set of principles
("organic law"52) that provide a framework to guide the nation through changing
times. Rather than interpreting the Constitution as code, it is more appropriate
to view the founding document as a set of abstract principles53 that are capable
51 A prominent pragmatic reason to allow same-sex unions is to prevent dependence on the
government. Presumably, dependence on the government can occur in the absence of benefits
from a legal union (health care, insurance), and in the absence of protections of legal unions (ali-
mony, support payments, etc.). Other pragmatic reasons will be explored in Part VI. See infra
notes 188-227 and accompanying text.
52 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 249 (7th ed. 2000). A constitution is defined as "the fundamental
and organic law of a nation or state, establishing the conception, character, and organization of its
government, as well as prescribing the extent of its sovereign power and the manner of its exer-
cise." Id.
53 Joel Feinberg, Law from the Perspective of the Judge, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 108, 111 (6"h ed.
2000). When speaking to the Judiciary Committee about constitutional interpretation, then Judge
John Roberts provided words supporting a principled view: "'I depart from some views of origi-
nal intent,' Judge Roberts said, without naming names. 'I think you need to look at the words
they use,' referring to the framers of the Constitution, 'and if the words adopt a broader principle,
it applies more broadly."' Roberts went on to claim that some uses of broad language (including
"'liberty' and "'due process"') indicate that "'they were crafting a document that they intended to
apply in a meaningful way down the ages."' See Adam Liptak and Robin Toner, Roberts Parries
Queries on Roe and End of Life, THE NEW YORK TIMES, September 15, 2005, at Al.
2005]
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of being "adapted to the various crises of human affairs., 54 Through following
this outline of principles, the country is guided towards good governance.
Therefore, questions should not only be asked about same-sex marriage con-
cerning constitutional jurisprudence, legal validity, and other positive law, but
broader questions should also be asked. What position on same-sex marriage
best embodies the principles that are implicit in the Constitution? What position
better represents doctrines of equality, liberty, and freedom?
This principled form of interpretation is as old as the Constitution it-
self.55 Broadly defined as functionalism, even the framers realized that constitu-
tional interpretation should not be constrained by their perceptions of the
world.56 When speaking to the framers' intentions of how to treat the Constitu-
tion, the Court has stated: "They knew times can blind us to certain truths and
later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact
serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation
can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom., 57 Therefore,
even under an original intent lens, the framers envisioned a functionalist inter-
pretation of the Constitution.
It is against this philosophical backdrop that more finite constitutional
arguments supporting same-sex marriage unfold. Stopping short of claiming an
unambiguous constitutional mandate for same-sex marriage, this Section will
show that Supreme Court precedent exists that reasonably supports recognition
of same-sex marriages - as will be illustrated, similar leaps have been taken in
the past. Most importantly, this Section proves that the constitutional principles
of equality, liberty, and justice are on the side of equal recognition. The follow-
ing arguments unfold in order of immediate relevancy.
54 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819). In his widely renowned opin-
ion, Chief Justice John Marshall, himself appointed by John Adams, declared: "we must never
forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding ... intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs." Id.
55 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 1 (Harvard
University Press 1980). Nonoriginalism, noninterpretivism, and other variations on a functionalist
view advocate reading beyond the norms that are clearly implicit in the Constitution and enforc-
ing norms that cannot be discovered within the four comers of the document. Id.
56 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885,
948 (1985). Much historical research has been aimed at proving that the modem notion of origi-
nal intent is historically inaccurate: "[A]t the time, that term referred to the 'intentions' of the
sovereign parties to the constitutional compact," and not "to the personal intentions of the framers
or of anyone else." Id. Further problems persist with traditional original intent interpretation,
including discerning group decision making, inadequate evidence of intent, ambiguity, and ulti-
mately a different reality in the late 1700s when the framers drafted the Constitution. PETER M.
SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF PowERs LAW 12 (1996).
57 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
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B. The Equal Protection Clause
Because of the presence of compelling Supreme Court precedent related
to the issue of banning civil unions,58 this Article confines its Equal Protection
analysis to this specific issue, and does not extend to the granting of all marriage
rights. The Due Process Clause analysis explores the argument that the Consti-
tution guarantees same-sex couples marriage rights.
The assertion of "equal protection of the laws" contained in the Four-
teenth Amendment has a long and rich history since its inception in the wake of
slavery in 1868.59 The Supreme Court has historically used this clause to ensure
equality for minorities, women, aliens, and even homosexuals. 60  As with any
equal protection challenge, the starting point is rationality review: is the dis-
criminatory statute in question rationally related to a legitimate state interest?
6 1
5s Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
59 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). Ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment occurred on July 9, 1868 after the Civil War as a way to ensure equality
for the newly freed slaves. Id.
60 The following table serves as a general reminder of the Court's standards of review when it
performs Equal Protection analysis:
Standard Classification at Issue General Test
Strict Scrutiny Race, Religion, Compelling state interest Nar-
National Origin, Alienage rowly tailored / necessary
Heightened / Intermediate Sex / Gender Important state interest
Review Illegitimacy Substantially related
Minimum Rationality Age, Disability, Legitimate state interest
Review Sexual Orientation Rationally related
For cases generally demonstrating strict scrutiny, see generally Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny in the context of alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967) (applying strict scrutiny in the context of race); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954) (applying strict scrutiny in the context of race); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944) (applying strict scrutiny in the context of race).
For cases generally demonstrating minimum rationality review, see generally Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying minimum rationality review in the context of sexual orien-
tation); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (applying minimum rational-
ity review in the context of disability); Mass. Bd. ofRet. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (applying
minimum rationality review in the context of age).
For cases generally demonstrating a heightened standard, see generally United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (applying a heightened standard in the context of sex/gender);
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (applying a heightened standard in the context of illegitimacy
and noting that "[tlo withstand intermediate scrutiny, a statutory classification must be substan-
tially related to an important governmental objective"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976)
(applying a heightened standard in the context of sex/gender and further clarifying that "a party
seeking to uphold government action based on sex must establish an 'exceedingly persuasive
justification' for the classification").
61 Rationality review first found its way into a Supreme Court opinion way back in 1819,
albeit in regards to the Necessary and Proper Clause. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
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Since the discriminatory effect of marriage laws on same-sex couples is
self-evident,62 no exercise is needed to prove that denial of the equal rights of
marriage is de facto discrimination. Rather, discussion of the legal conse-
quences implicit with differing types of discrimination is warranted (namely,
invidious/purposeful discrimination as compared to incidental discrimination).63
Romer v. Evans,64 a landmark Supreme Court case, effectively illustrates sexual
orientation discrimination and the implications of purposeful discrimination.
1. Romer v. Evans and Purposeful Discrimination
Romer held invalid a Colorado state constitutional amendment that for-
bade the state, its local governments, and public agencies to enact any statute
that would entitle homosexuals to protected status or allow a claim of discrimi-
nation, among other protections.65 The purpose of the failed amendment66 was
to counteract anti-discrimination statutes passed in places like Aspen, Boulder,
316 (1819). Rationality review for Equal Protection typically has three components: 1) What is
the governmental interest and is it a constitutionally legitimate interest? 2) What are the statute's
means, and how does it advance a governmental interest? and 3) Are the burdens imposed by the
means irrational or substantially more burdensome than necessary? R. Randall Kelso, Standards
of Review Under the Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Protecting
Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six" Model and Modem Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 225, 227-28 (2002).
62 See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Dis-
crimination, 69 N.Y.U.L. REV. 197 (1994).
63 In the Supreme Court's analysis of racial discrimination, these two types of discrimination
are referred to as "de jure" discrimination and "de facto" discrimination. De jure discrimination is
the enactment of a law that, even if facially neutral, has a purpose or motive to discriminate. De
facto discrimination is the enactment of a law that is always facially neutral in its language but has
a disadvantaging impact or effect. See KATHLEEN SULLIVAN AND GERALD GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 713 (14"h ed., Fountain Press 2001).
64 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
65 Id. at 635.
6 Id. at 624.
Amendment 2, in explicit terms, does more than repeal or rescind these provi-
sions. It prohibits all legislative, executive or judicial action at any level of
state of local government designed to protect the named class, a class we shall
refer to as homosexual persons or gays and lesbians. The amendment reads:
'No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts,
shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or rela-
tionships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person or
class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, pro-
tected status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall
be in all respects self-executing.'
[Vol. 108
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and Denver.67 In its reasoning, the Romer court relied on equal protection
analysis, 68 marking the first time that homosexuals were protected in a Supreme
Court decision.69 Under this analysis, the court held that the state did not have a
legitimate interest, and determined that this legislation was "born of animosity
toward the class of persons affected."7 Romer stands for the proposition that
communities cannot be pre-empted from protecting or establishing rights for
homosexuals.71
The Court's extension of scrutinizing legislation with a discriminatory
purpose towards classifications based on sexual orientation is profound.7 2 Be-
cause of Romer, if purposeful discrimination can be proven against homosexu-
als, the discriminatory laws are much easier to invalidate.73 This extension is
significant because many recent marriage laws (especially those that ban any
rights of marriage), appear to be implemented solely to discriminate against
homosexuals.
74
Despite the far-reaching effects of invalidating purposeful discrimina-
tion, using this logic does not ensure that equal rights are automatically pro-
vided. Even when taking purposeful discrimination into account, many laws
without a discriminatory purpose exist that prevent same-sex couples from hav-
ing equal rights.75  However, taking purposeful discrimination into account
would mean that a massive amount of legislation approved in the past decade
would immediately become constitutionally suspect. This legislation includes
all laws banning civil unions, DOMA, and other measures taken to prevent ho-
mosexuals from obtaining rights. 76 These implications mean that Romer is per-
67 Id. at 623-24. These statutes sought to bar discrimination in employment, housing, insur-
ance, and public accommodations on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. at 626-27.
68 Id. at 631.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 634.
71 Id. at 624.
72 The Court has a long history of protecting politically unpopular groups through invalidating
purposeful discrimination. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (disenfranchised black
voters); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (purposeful discrimination against blacks);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (purposeful discrimination against Chinese). These are
just three prominent cases that frown upon purposeful discrimination.
73 This is exactly what Romer held. 517 U.S. at 635-36.
74 See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-1. Many states, including West Virginia, have recently
changed laws to specifically define marriage in a way to exclude homosexual couples. Id. Other
examples include the eleven states that banned same-sex marriage as a result of the 2004 elec-
tions. See Hitt, supra note 1.
75 For example, the purpose of the original marriage laws enacted in the Eighteenth and Nine-
teenth centuries was presumably to provide recognition to common law marriages, not to specifi-
cally discriminate against homosexuals (since homosexuality was largely a crime, same-sex mar-
riage was not even on the radar screen).
76 Extensive analysis is not needed to show that the purpose of these laws is to ensure that
same-sex couples do not receive rights - for the most part, this discriminatory purpose is facially
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haps even more valuable than Loving or Lawrence77 are toward gay rights
causes in the short term.
2. Comparing Romer to Other Statewide Referendums
The next logical step for judicial intervention is to enforce Romer
against the practice of banning civil unions. In November 2004, eight states
passed laws by popular vote that altered their state constitutions. 78 The follow-
ing is an example of a referendum that passed: "(1) Marriage consists only of
the legal union between a man and a woman. (2) No other domestic union, how-
ever denominated, may be recognized as a marriage or given the same or sub-
stantially equivalent legal effect.",79  These referendums effectively ban the
granting of rights to homosexual couples.
The state constitutional amendment invalidated in Romer shares many
similarities with state constitutional amendments that were passed during the
2004 elections: 1) they were achieved by statewide referendum;80 2) they
were "born of animosity towards the class of persons affected;"'8 and 3) they
have a discriminatory purpose (by preventing rights from being obtained or be-
coming a "protected class" 82).
Indeed, amendments like Utah's symbolize a pre-emptive attack on
rights for homosexuals, for none of the states gave homosexual couples any
legal rights before the referendum.8 3 This type of legislation is operating on
very shaky ground because of its oppressive qualities. In light of civil rights
developments, using the legislature to prevent a group from obtaining rights is
something that the Court continually rejects. 84 As an assertive action to prevent
civil rights, it inherently faces a higher level of scrutiny than laws that grant
civil rights unequally.
in the statutes. See infra note 79 and accompanying text; DOMA, supra note 17. Analysis of a
religious purpose, however, is explored in this Article. Infra notes 132-44 and accompanying text.
77 These are two other cases analyzed in detail in this Article. See infra notes 92-131 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
78 See Hitt, supra note 1. The eight states are Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah. Id.
79 UTAH CONST. art. I § 29. See also H.J.R. 25, at http://www.le.state.ut. us/-2004/bills/ hbil-
lenr/hjr025.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2005) (emphasis added).
80 See Hitt, supra note 1; Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
81 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. It is plausible that arguments exist that the laws roots are not be-
cause of "animus," but because of protecting families or protecting the sanctity of marriage.
These justifications are explored in Part V.
82 Id. at 624. Without a doubt, many legal protections are implicit to marriage or civil unions.
83 See Hitt, supra note 1.
84 See generally Romer, 517 U.S. 620; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Hunter v. Un-
derwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (disenfranchised black voters); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S.
339 (1960) (purposeful discrimination against blacks). Indeed, the Court has an extensive history
of prohibiting the use of the legislature to disadvantage minorities.
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The consequences are dire when banning rights that homosexuals have
never possessed. For example, because of statutes like Utah's, any proposed
legislation that would give homosexuals even a minimum level of rights faces
likely defeat in the eyes of the prohibitory statute. If any rights accorded to ho-
mosexuals are established to be "equivalent" 85 to rights of marriage, the new
statute outlaws it. When taken to the extreme that these amendments have been
in banning any rights arising from a homosexual relationship, it seems difficult
to comprehend it passing rationality review. What rationale exists to deny pro-
tection to a child, or to prevent visitation rights?86 Indeed, it would be hard for
the Supreme Court to rule that the banning of rights not achieved is constitu-
tional since it has already ruled exactly the opposite in Romer: "A law declaring
that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citizens than for all
others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of
the laws in the most literal sense.,
87
In wrapping up discussion on Romer, three main points exist that sup-
port equal protection for homosexuals. First, and most importantly, by finding
that a law disavowing any possibility of a "protected" status is unconstitu-
tional,88 it indicates that the recent banning of civil unions is unconstitutional.
Second, it reinforces the Supreme Court adage that morals legislation cannot be
motivated by "animus" towards a particular group.89 Lastly, in what cannot be
over-emphasized, it officially establishes that homosexuals, just like so many
other legal classifications, are worthy of Equal Protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 90 Having such strong precedent in Romer, along with the Court's
traditional frowning upon purposeful discrimination, means that the invalidation
of civil union bans is the most timely, legally valid claim for equal rights. 91
85 See supra note 79.
86 A detailed examination of legitimate state interests takes place in Section V.
87 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633-34. Justice Kennedy continues, "'The guaranty of 'equal protection
of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."' Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886))).
88 Id. at 624.
89 Id. at 634.
90 Id. In what often goes unnoticed, the Lawrence decision (discussed in the context of the Due
Process Clause) decriminalizing homosexual conduct in 2003 only enhances the 1996 holding in
Romer, for it was still technically legal to criminalize homosexual conduct at the time of the Ro-
mer decision. The court chose to leave this logical fallacy for another day (a fact that was duly
noted in the Romer dissent). Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting). To be sure, if Romer did not assert
Equal Protection back in 1996, a vital link in constitutional protection would be missing.
91 Other valid equal protection arguments exist. Most notably, arguments that the discrimina-
tion faced by homosexuals is sex discrimination has been embraced by courts in Vermont and
Hawaii. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993)
(superseded by constitutional amendment, HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23); see generally Koppelman,
supra note 62. Sex discrimination analysis can trigger a heightened level of scrutiny. See gener-
ally United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976). The
Supreme Court has not used sex discrimination analysis in any rulings regarding gay rights.
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C. The Due Process Clause
Due Process arguments in this Section focus on same-sex couples re-
ceiving rights of marriage, and not just the banning of civil unions. The follow-
ing two Supreme Court decisions from different eras will be used to analyze the
Due Process Clause: 92 Loving v. Virginia and Lawrence v. Texas. Although
these cases do not signal a holding as strong as Romer for the purposes of same-
sex marriage, their presence gives the court sound rationale to ensure equal
rights for homosexual couples.
1. Loving and its Legacy: Marriage is a Fundamental Right
Loving v. Virginia93 is a historic civil rights case that struck down a Vir-
ginia statute forbidding a "white person" from marrying a "colored person." 94
In this case, a white man and black woman were sentenced to jail for a year
when they married each other in 1958. 95 In reversing the conviction, the U.S.
Supreme Court relied on both substantive due process and equal protection to
invalidate the statute.96 As equal protection was expanded upon above, Loving
92 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ...
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
93 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
94 Id. at 6. At the time, fifteen other states contained similar statutes to Virginia's: "Mar-
riages void without decree. - All marriages between a white person and a colored person shall be
absolutely void without any decree of divorce or other legal process." Id. at 4 n.3 (citing VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-57 (1960 Repl. Vol.)). The unconstitutional Virginia statute then provided very
technical definitions for "'white persons' and "'colored persons."' Id. at 5 n.4.
95 Id. at 2-3. A vivid account of the Lovings' ordeal is as follows:
Mildred did not know that interracial marriage was illegal in Virginia, but
Richard did. This explains why, on June 2, 1958, he drove them across the
Virginia state line to Washington, D.C., to be married.... Five weeks later, on
July 11, their quiet life was shattered when they were awakened early in the
morning as three law officers "acting on an anonymous tip" opened the
unlocked door of their home, walked into their bedroom, and shined a flashlight
in their faces. Caroline County Sheriff R. Garnett Brooks demanded to know
what the two of them were doing in bed together. Mildred answered, "I'm his
wife," while Richard pointed to the District of Columbia marriage certificate
that hung on their bedroom wall. "That's no good here," Sheriff Brooks re-
plied. He charged the couple with unlawful cohabitation, and then he and his
two deputies hauled the Lovings off to a nearby jail in Bowling Green.
Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal Narrative of
Loving v. Virginia, 41 How. L.J. 229, 236 (1998).
96 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12. Equal Protection analysis (strict scrutiny) was used for racial classi-
fications, and Due Process analysis was used to establish marriage as a fundamental right:
There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom to marry solely because of
racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause.... To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as
the racial classifications embodies in these statutes, classifications so directly
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will be analyzed in this Article solely in the context of marriage rather than race.
The Loving decision spawned a rich legacy 97 that has increased the level of scru-
tiny applied to laws that regulate marriage, has increased access to marriage,
and has enhanced notions of personal autonomy. As such, Loving has been in-
fluential in shaping people's perception of marriage.
The most important idea that Loving and its legacy presents in the con-
text of gay rights is that it unequivocally establishes that marriage is a funda-
mental right under the Due Process Clause.98 This establishment is paramount
because under subsequent Supreme Court decisions, there must be a compelling
reason to deny a citizen a fundamental right if the law "significantly inter-
fere[s]" with that right.99 The right to marriage is protected in the right to pri-
vacy, where similar rights such as reproductive freedoms, raising children, and
consensual homosexual relations reside. 1o
In Loving, the Supreme Court went out of its way to emphasize that
marriage is a fundamental right; the Court could have just as easily relied solely
on strict scrutiny for racial classifications to invalidate the law. In fact, since the
Court's decision, Loving's legacy has been its assertion that marriage is "a fun-
damental right," rather than its strict scrutiny application for racial classifica-
subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, is surely to deprive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process
of law.
Id.
97 The term "Loving's Legacy" is found in the following Article: Allison Moore, Loving's
Legacy: The Other Antidiscrimination Principles, 34 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 163 (1999). In the
context of marriage, Loving's legacy includes Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), Zablocki v.
Redhail,434 U.S. 374 (1978), Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003),
and Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), among others.
98 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital
personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.").
99 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 386-87. This case held that a law preventing one from marrying if
they are behind on their child support payments is unconstitutional. In clarifying the majority's
analysis, Justice Marshall reasoned:
By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean
to suggest that every state regulation which relates in any way to the incidents
of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To the
contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with deci-
sions to enter into the marital relationship may legitimately be imposed. See
Califano v. Jobst, ante, p. 47; n.12, infra. The statutory classification at issue
here, however, clearly does interfere directly and substantially with the right to
marry.
Id. Justice Powell's concurrence endorses a "compelling state purpose" standard. Id. at 399.
10 Reproductive freedoms: Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Raising children: Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972);
Pierce v. Soc. of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Consen-
sual sexual relations: Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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tions. 10 1 Specifically, Zablocki v. Redhail provides a vital link by emphasizing a
"'critical examination' for any law that "significantly interferes" with the fun-
damental right to marry.10 2 Additionally, another parallel drawn to Zablocki is
the concept of state coercion in giving up the right to marry:
These persons are absolutely prevented from getting married.
Many others, able in theory to satisfy the statute's requirements,
will be sufficiently burdened by having to do so that they will in
effect be coerced into forgoing their right to marry. And even
those who can be persuaded to meet the statute's requirements
suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of choice in an area
in which we have held such freedom to be fundamental. 1
03
This "fundamental right" point, and the implications thereof cannot be
over-emphasized, because it means that the justification for the law must with-
stand heavier scrutiny than a non-fundamental right.1°4 Therefore, even if the
Court declines to use heightened scrutiny in Equal Protection analysis, height-
ened scrutiny is alternatively available under substantive due process analysis
due to Loving and its offspring.
Loving and its legacy also lend some needed perspective on the issue
because it illustrates that society's concept of marriage has evolved over time.
Loving reflects that marriage used to be confined to races, a notion that most
consider preposterous today. 105 This paradigm shift reflected in Loving and its
legacy resulted in marriage being less about property rights and procreation, and
more about love and commitment: "[Marriages] are expressions of emotional
101 See Mark Strasser, Loving, Baehr, and the Right to Marry: On Legal Argumentation and
Sophistical Rhetoric, 24 NOVA. L. REV. 769, 776 n.46 (2000) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) specifically as cases
that cite Loving's fundamental right to marry).
102 434 U.S. at 383. "Since our past decisions make clear that the right to marry is of funda-
mental importance, and since the classification at issue here significantly interferes with the exer-
cise of that right, we believe that 'critical examination' of the state interests advanced in support
of the classification is required." Id. (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
312, 314 (1976)).
103 Id. at 387.
104 Id. at 388. "When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right, it cannot be upheld unless it is supported by sufficiently important state inter-
ests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those interests." Id. Perhaps even stronger support
for higher scrutiny of laws effecting marital status can be found in Justice Stevens' concurrence:
"A classification based on marital status is fundamentally different from a classification which
determines who may lawfully enter into the marriage relationship. The individual's interest in
making the marriage decision independently is sufficiently important to merit special constitu-
tional protection." Id. at 403-04.
105 Likewise, forty years from now, people may look back on the banning of same-sex unions
in a similar distasteful light.
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support and public commitment. These elements are an important and signifi-
cant aspect of the marital relationship."'
0 6
Related to this perception shift is the Loving Court's rejection of a reli-
gious argument that is similar to one used against homosexuals.'0 7 One varia-
tion of a morality argument was front and center in Loving, and was in fact used
as reasoning in the trial court's opinion upholding the discriminatory statute:
'Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay
and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for
the interference with his arrangement there would be no cause
for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows
that he did not intend for the races to mix.' 1
08
The Court's disfavor for using morality as a compelling state interest
will be explored later, 1°9 but it is useful to highlight this tendency here since it
was demonstrated in Loving.
As important and useful as Loving may be, it is essential to recognize
the distinctions between Loving and any homosexual movement. Recognizing
these distinctions not only honors the racial struggle implicit in Loving as
unique, but also presents the facts accurately. In Loving, the challenged state
statute not only failed to recognize the defendants' marriage, but also sent viola-
tors to jail for one to five years if they married." 0 No punishment of this sort is
at issue for same-sex marriage, rather the debate is over the legal recognition of
that marriage. While this does not mean that Loving is incomparable to any
same-sex marriage case, 1 it does mean that Loving does not explicitly mandate
same-sex marriage. Loving elevated marriage's role as a fundamental right, and
helped set the legal playing field for marriage laws.
112
106 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1987). The Turner court even hints at First Amend-
ment arguments in its dicta: "many religions recognize marriage as having spiritual significance;
for some inmates and their spouses, therefore, the commitment of marriage may be an exercise of
religious faith as well as an expression of personal dedication." ld. at 96.
107 Although the use of religious arguments is explored in greater detail later in the paper, a
quick synopsis of a variation of an extreme, oversimplified religious argument was spoken by
Senator Jesse Helms while debating DOMA: "'God created Adam and Eve, not Adam and
Steve."' ROBERT M. BAIRD & STUART E. ROSENBAUM, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE MORAL AND
LEGAL DEBATE 21 (1997).
108 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting the trial court's opinion).
109 See infra notes 155-69 and accompanying text.
110 Id. at 4.
III See Strasser, supra note 101 at 771. The significance of this difference of jail time has yet
to be adequately explained. Loving would have no doubt turned out the same way if there was
simply a law prohibiting legal recognition, as is the case with gay marriage. See id. at 772.
112 Perhaps the absence of the same-sex marriage issue in Loving is a blessing in disguise, for
while the principled support for same-sex marriage from this case is strong, the 1967 Court proba-
bly did not foresee this connection.
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In summary, Loving and its legacy relate to same-sex marriage not only
by supplying some needed perspective, but also by presenting the appropriate
level of scrutiny to apply to marriage laws: "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil
rights of man,' . . . and therefore a denial of this right must withstand heav-
ier scrutiny than a denial of a non-fundamental right.
2. Lawrence v. Texas
Unlike Loving, Lawrence directly addresses the issue of homosexual
rights and, while the Court does not go so far as to mandate same-sex marriage,
it provides a necessary step to ensure equal rights for homosexuals. To be sure,
any discussion of gay rights and same-sex marriage would not be complete
without addressing this landmark case 14 and its many implications for same-sex
marriage.
In Lawrence, two homosexual men were charged with criminal sodomy
when a police officer, responding to a reported weapons disturbance, witnessed
these men "engaging in a sexual act."' 15 After criticizing the majority's ration-
ale in Bowers v. Hardwick,'16 the Lawrence Court unequivocally overruled the
much maligned Bowers holding in asserting a liberty interest in "intimate con-
duct."1 7 Although much of the majority's dicta implies heightened scrutiny,' 
18
the actual holding reveals that Texas's statute does not survive rationality re-
view.1 19 In the Court's reasoning, much support can be found for legal recogni-
tion of same-sex unions.
Implicit in the Court's holding is the logical conclusion that homosexu-
ality can no longer be a crime. This fact is a setback to the opposition's argu-
ment against same-sex marriage because the former legitimate state interest of
preventing homosexuality can no longer be used. This basic holding clears the
way for a legal challenge concerning same-sex marriage, since it would have
113 388 U.S. at 12 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)). See also Turner,
482 U.S. at 95; Zablocki, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941, 957 (2003)
(citing Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541).
114 See Mark Strasser, Lawrence and Same-Sex Marriage Bans, 69 BROOK. L. REv. 1003, 1004
(2004). In short, Lawrence is (and may remain) the most discussed case for gay rights, right there
on par with Brown, Loving, and Griswold in constitutional law notoriety. As such, the Lawrence
holding provided a jumpstart to the gay rights movement back in 2003 because of its unequivocal
decriminalization of homosexual conduct. Id.
15 539 U.S. 558, 563 (2003). The Texas statute provided: "A person commits an offense if he
engages in deviate sexual intercourse with another individual of the same sex." Id.
116 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Bowers upheld the legality of a law criminalizing sodomy. Id. at 196.
17 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-67.
11 See id. at 574. Heightened scrutiny is implied through the court's comparison to other pri-
vacy rights subject to heightened scrutiny such as marriage, procreation, family relationships, and
child rearing. Id.
9 See id. at 578 ("The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.").
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been nearly impossible to convincingly argue for same-sex marriage when ho-
mosexual activity is legally criminalized. In fact, somewhat ironically, the dis-
sent accurately captures the essence of the holding better than the majority:
"Today's opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permit-
ted a distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, inso-
far as formal recognition in marriage is concerned."
120
Beyond the importance of the Court's basic holding is the abundance of
support (either direct or indirect) provided in various parts of Lawrence's four
separate opinions. 121 With respect to same-sex marriage, the most weighty and
explicit support is found in several passages from Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion. One of them reads:
• ..our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education. In ex-
plaining the respect the Constitution demands for the autonomy
of the person in making these choices, we stated as follows:
"These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of
the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about
these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were
they formed under compulsion of the State."'
22
These general allusions to civil liberties transcend many rights issues.
However, specific to marriage, the liberty interests at stake that the Court identi-
fied are "'intimate and personal choices,' ..... personal dignity and autonomy,'
and "'the right to define one's own concept of existence."''1 23 It is arguable that
the state denies homosexual couples this "dignity" when it refuses to grant ho-
mosexual couples the rights that it grants other monogamous relationships.
One who wants to gauge the significance of this portion of Justice Ken-
nedy's opinion need look no further than Justice Scalia's lengthy dissent.
1 24
One of his heaviest criticisms of the majority's decision concerned the above
120 Id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
121 See id. (Kennedy, J., writing majority opinion; O'Connor, J., concurring; Scalia, J., dissent-
ing; Thomas, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 574 (quoting Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
123 Id.
124 Id. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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passage, as he expressed the view that it supports same-sex marriage.125 Indeed,
this admission regarding the Court's reasoning as a basis for same-sex marriage
speaks for itself in terms of its importance for a possible future decision. How-
ever, despite these somewhat exaggerated claims, Lawrence in and of itself does
not grant homosexuals marriage rights.
Another relevant passage in Lawrence that alludes to marriage reads:
"When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another person,
the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.
The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to
make this choice.' '126 Suffice it to say, Justice Kennedy does not elaborate on
this "personal bond," but one can infer that he is alluding to intimate relation-
ships whether they be heterosexual or same-sex. This reference supports an
argument that in order to have this "personal bond," marriage or an equivalent
legal union, must be available to same-sex couples.
One last aspect of Lawrence that assists the legal argument for same-sex
marriage is the level of disfavor the Court showed in using pure moral disap-
proval to regulate conduct that does not hurt others. 127 Because most marriages
have public components,128 arguments that same-sex marriages do hurt other
people are bound to be made, though the Lawrence Court did not explore any
possible injury inflicted by legalizing same-sex marriages. 129  The disfavor
shown to moral disapproval as a justification, as well as further exploration of
any injury associated with same-sex marriage, are explored in further detail in
Section V. However, as Lawrence announces the "general rule"'130 of the Court
that moral disapproval without injury does not satisfy rationality review, this
important principle is acknowledged. 131
In summary, Lawrence signifies the major first step in obtaining equal
rights for gays by decriminalizing homosexual conduct. This development un-
dermines and dilutes the opposition's argument in multiple ways. Additionally,
the majority's reasoning is very open to the prospect of same-sex marriage.
125 Id. at 604. Justice Scalia offers a synopsis of the majority opinion: "which notes the consti-
tutional protections afforded to 'personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contracep-
tion, family relationships, child rearing, and education,' and then declares that 'persons in a homo-
sexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do."' Id.
126 Id. at 567. Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Scalia also cited this passage as the court's support
for same-sex marriage. Id. at 604-05.
127 Id. at 567 ("This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court,
to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person .... ).
128 See Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 307,
314(2004).
129 See Strasser, supra note 114, at 1011.
130 See supra note 127 and accompanying text which discusses the "general rule" of Romer.
131 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567.
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D. The Establishment Clause
Generally, Establishment Clause 132 case history is just as extensive and
diverse as that of the other clauses discussed in this Article. 133 However, unlike
the other clauses explored in this Article, no Supreme Court cases exist 134 that
address the intersection of homosexuality and the Establishment Clause.
1 35
Establishment Clause review indicates that laws with a religious pur-
pose can be invalidated. 36 Many laws can easily be determined to have a reli-
gious purpose once the legislative records are taken into account.' 37 At a mini-
mum, the Establishment Clause calls into question the constitutionality of
DOMA and the many state laws banning same-sex unions.
Because "the Establishment Clause does not ban federal or state regula-
tion of conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or harmonize
with the tenets of some or all religions,' 38 a purpose of institutionalizing a reli-
132 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend I (emphasis added).
133 See generally Rubinstein, supra note 5. Cases on the Establishment Clause involve issues
such as government appropriations (Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)), Sunday
closing laws (McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)) and the displaying of nativity scenes
on government property (Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)).
134 The intersection of gay rights and the Establishment Clause does not occur frequently. See
Rubinstein, supra note 5, at 1589-91. More often than not, arguments for gay rights are predi-
cated on either Equal Protection (explored earlier), or Substantive Due Process. See Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Baehr v. Lewin,
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
135 The Establishment Clause has been tested in conjunction with homosexuality on several
occasions, where the various courts have consistently declined to use it as a basis for granting
homosexuals equal rights. See Rubinstein, supra note 5, at n.52 (citing Hatheway v. Sec'y of the
Army, 641 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (9 1h Cir. 1981)); Nat'l Gay Task Force v. Bd. of Educ., No. CIV-
80-1174-E, 1982 WL 31038, at 11 (W.D. Okla. June 29, 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 729 F.2d
1270 ( 10 th Cir. 1984), afftd, 470 U.S. 903 (1985); People v. Baldwin, 112 Cal. Rptr. 290, 292 (Ct.
App. 1974); Steward v. United States, 364 A.2d 1205, 1208-09 (D.C. 1976)). Ultimately, when
courts have been faced with Establishment Clause challenges to traditional, older marriage laws,
secular reasons such as procreation, protecting children, and promoting the public health are given
to deflect the attention from religion (the merits of these secular arguments are explored later in
the Article). See Taylor, supra note 35, at 178-79.
136 See Donovan, supra note 17, at 342. The "Lemon Test" is summarized as follows: "First,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be
one that neither advances nor inhibits religion .... ; finally, the statute must not foster 'an exces-
sive government entanglement with religion."' Id. (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
612-13 (1971)). Additionally, a law without secular purpose is presumptively motivated by relig-
ion. Id. at 341.
137 Id. at 349-54. Because of the transparency of how laws that ban same-sex marriage or civil
unions were passed, and because of who traditionally sponsors legislation targeted against same-
sex couples, many laws can easily be determined to have a religious purpose. Id.
138 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961).
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gious principle must be found. 139 In other words, laws that are on shaky consti-
tutional ground are those that have been passed with the specific purpose to
deny same-sex couples equal rights, and can also be traced to religious origins.
Proving a religious purpose is certainly feasible in many cases upon ex-
amination of a law's legislative history. A look at the debate in Congress over
DOMA reveals:
We as legislators and leaders for the country are in the midst of
a chaos, an attack upon God's principles. God laid down that
one man and one woman is a legal union. That is marriage,
known for thousands of years. That God-given principle is un-
der attack. There are those in our society that try to shift us
away from a society based on religious principles to humanistic
principles; that the human being can do whatever they [sic]
want, as long as it feels good and does not hurt others. When
one State wants to move towards the recognition of same-sex
marriages, it is wrong... We as a Federal Government have a
responsibility to act, and we will act.1
4°
Statements like these contained in the legislative record, by those who
cosponsored the bill,14 ' leave little room to dispute that the purpose of DOMA
was to institute a "'religious principle."",142 Time and time again, legislation that
is pursued to deny rights to same-sex couples relies extensively on religious
principles. 143
139 See Rubinstein, supra note 5, at 1598 (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688-90
(1984)). Similar to the test that the Court has developed for Equal Protection, if a religious pur-
pose can be identified in enacting the law, the Court is much more likely to invalidate it. Id.
140 142 CONG. REc. H7486 (daily ed. July 12, 1996) (statement of Rep. Buyer) (emphasis
added). Even West Virginia's Senator Robert C. Byrd has read directly from the Bible to support
his argument:
I hold in my hands a Bible, the Bible that was in my home when I was a child.
This is the Bible that was read to me by my foster father. It is a Bible, the cover
of which having been torn and worn, has been replaced. But this is the Bible,
the King James Bible. And here is what it says in the first chapter of Genesis,
27th and 28th verses: 'So God created man in his own image, in the image of
God created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them,
and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth...'
And when God used the word 'multiply,' . . . [h]e was talking about procrea-
tion, multiplying, populating the Earth.
142 CONG REC. S10, 109 (daily ed. Sept. 10, 1996) (emphasis added).
141 See generally Defense of Marriage Act of July 9, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-664, 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905.
142 142 CONG. REc. H7486. Rep. Buyer himself openly admits it is a "'religious principle."'
143 The highest profile example of this is the failed attempt at a federal constitutional amend-
ment to ban same-sex marriage. H.R.J. Res. 56, 1081h Cong. (2004).
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However, this recent wave of legislation banning same-sex unions does
not mean that marriage laws on the books before the gay marriage debate are as
suspect. In these instances, a religious purpose will not be as easily identifiable.
Similar to the Equal Protection Clause argument discussed above using Romer,
the reach of this Establishment Clause argument would have the effect of simply
invalidating laws aimed at banning homosexual unions, but would do nothing to
improve same-sex couples' chances at being included in what remains. An Es-
tablishment Clause argument would only prevent further discriminatory laws
from being implemented rather than grant homosexuals the rights of marriage.
For now, the Establishment Clause argument seems to be in the back-
ground despite its relevance and legal validity. The reality that homosexual
rights has not had as strong a connection to the Establishment Clause as it has to
other clauses such as the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause is
rather perplexing when confronted with the reality that religion represents the
root of modem homosexual condemnation.144 However, because of the undeni-
able link between religion and condemnation of homosexuality, an Establish-
ment Clause argument remains valid.
E. The "Forgotten" Amendment
The final legal argument that is briefly raised in this Section is the pres-
ence of a helpful context clue that can be used in conjunction with other legal
arguments. Though seldom invoked, the "forgotten"' 145 Ninth Amendment is a
silent yet potent protector of civil rights. This Amendment reads that "[the
rights listed in the Constitution] shall not be construed to deny or disparage oth-
ers retained by the people."'' 46 The symbolism in invoking this clause need not
be overlooked, for the only same-sex marriage challenge that has reached the
Supreme Court thus far used the Ninth Amendment in part.
147
144 See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
145 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-90, n.6 (1965) (citing Bennett B. Patterson, THE
FORGOTrEN NINTH AMENDMENT (1955)). The Ninth Amendment has been coined as the "forgot-
ten" amendment. Id. After a lengthy vacation, the Ninth Amendment made its return to a Su-
preme Court opinion in Griswold. Phoebe A. Haddon, An Essay on the Ninth Amendment: Inter-
pretation for the New World Order, 2 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 93, 94, 97 (1992). Since
then, it has been used with increasing regularity. Id. at 96-98.
146 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Id This amendment is one of the
unheralded protectors of civil liberties and quite possibly hedges against assaults on civil liberties
that never take place. See generally, Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-90 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Without its presence, constructionists would have a much better case to claim that citizens' rights
are limited to those explicitly listed in the Bill of Rights. Id. The right to privacy, for instance,
might be interpreted entirely differently. Id. In this way, its silent nature can be deceiving.
147 This challenge (which was summarily dismissed) used the Ninth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
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The Ninth Amendment is a signal revealing that fundamental rights ex-
ist beyond those spelled out in the first eight amendments; a door where further
rights can be found. 48 Essentially, the rights protected by the Ninth Amend-
ment are equivalent to the word "liberty," minus the rights expressly granted in
the first eight amendments. 49 This includes the infamous "penumbra" identi-
fied in Griswold v. Connecticut that protects marital privacy rights. 50 As nei-
ther marriage nor privacy are rights that are specifically enumerated in the Con-
stitution, the Ninth Amendment is arguably relevant in these instances. The
amendment is thus most effective when raised alongside liberty (substantive due
process) claims.' 51
The presence of this amendment also helps dismiss notions that the
founders could have possibly provided for every civil rights dilemma in the fu-
ture.' 52 Indeed, the Ninth Amendment is not proof in and of itself that the Con-
stitution mandates same-sex marriage. Rather, it is an indication that the tradi-
tion and history of the nation supports an expansive view of rights. Raising the
Ninth Amendment in conjunction with other doctrines only adds to the persua-
siveness of those arguments. 53 It also adds to the repertoire of constitutional
devices available to fight for civil rights.
In summary, the legal arguments presented in this Section are all capa-
ble of coming before the Court in the future. Each of these clauses gives the
Court a reasonable basis to ensure equality for homosexuals. Specifically, Ro-
mer shows that the Court has already spoken to the issue of legislation targeting
homosexuals. As such, the scenario of a Supreme Court decision holding that
148 The Supreme Court dealt with the Ninth Amendment just seven times before Griswold.
Cameron S. Matheson, The Once and Future Ninth Amendment, 38 B.C. L. REv. 179, 188 (1996).
After Griswold, it has found its way into subsequent court opinions. Opinions (either plurality,
concurrence, or dissenting) since Griswold that have used the Ninth Amendment in a similar
expansive manner include Roe v. Wade and Hodgson v. Minnesota. See Haddon, supra note 145,
at 94. The unsuccessful challengers of a sodomy statute in Bowers v. Hardwick also used the
Ninth Amendment in its claims. 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986) (overruled by Lawrence v. Tex., 539
U.S. 558 (2003)).
149 See Matheson, supra note 148, at 190.
150 381 U.S. at 488-90 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
151 See supra notes 92-131 and accompanying text for a complete discussion on substantive due
process claims. It is no coincidence that most of the cases that have used the Ninth Amendment
have used it in conjunction with the Due Process Clause. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488-90;
Baker, 409 U.S. 810; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
152 See ELY, supra note 55; see also Matheson, supra note 148, at 182-184. A brief history of
the Ninth Amendment shows that its inclusion was insisted by the Antifederalists who worried
that the new Federal government retained too much power. Id. James Madison drafted a pro-
posed bill of rights, which provided the basis for the Ninth Amendment. Id. at 185. While further
details are debatable, it is largely agreed that it was included to squelch fears that listing rights in
the Constitution would imply that no others exist. Id.
153 The only Supreme Court challenge (which was summarily dismissed) relating to same-sex
marriage used the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. Baker, 409 U.S. 810; see also Griswold,
381 U.S. at 488-90; Roe, 410 U.S. at 152.
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efforts to ban homosexuals from receiving rights are unconstitutional is the most
realistic form of judicial intervention. Beyond the importance of judicial inter-
vention, however, remains the conclusion that acceptance of same-sex marriage
comports with constitutional principles; it is the just end result.
V. ADDRESSING LEGAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
As noted above, any constitutional analysis concerning the issue of
same-sex marriage provides multiple legal arguments supporting it. Conversely,
the legal arguments opposing equal rights for homosexuals are numerous, but
not as diverse. Many of these arguments inherently fall back on religion and
morality, which, as presented, display moral disapproval towards homosexu-
als. 154 Those arguments that do rely on a legitimate state interest (procreation,
child rearing, financial interests) additionally have holes that ultimately put their
ability to withstand rationality review in question. Lastly, there are arguments
against same-sex marriage that are grounded in legal and social theory rather
than a moral or state interest argument. Each one of these arguments will be
explored in kind.
A. Morality and Religion
Many different levels of morality arguments exist that oppose equal
rights for same-sex couples. 155 Some can be considered quite extreme,1 56 and
some are mild in comparison. 57 This Article does not attempt to pigeonhole all
of the morality arguments into one representation. Rather, this Article presents
one prevalent variation of the morality argument, consistently found in Supreme
Court opinions, that is used against homosexuals.
154 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 585 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155 See generally George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POLITICS
581 (1999).
156 Christian evangelist Jerry Falwell has blamed the terrorist attacks on "'the pagans, and the
abortionists, and the feminists, and the gays and the lesbians who are actively trying to make that
an alternative lifestyle."' Susan J. Becker, Tumbling Towers as Turning Points: Will 9/11 Usher
in a new Civil Rights Era for Gay Men and Lesbians in the United States?, 9 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 207, 220 (2003) (quoting The 700 Club (CBN television broadcast, Sept. 13, 2001)).
157 An example of a milder argument is the notion that homosexuals should not be blamed for
their sexual orientation; it is a mental health problem that can be treated. See American Psycho-
logical Association, Sexual Orientation and Homosexuality,
http://www.apahelpcenter.org/articles/article.php?id=31 (last visited Sept. 25, 2005) (noting the
existence of the position that homosexuality is a mental illness). While this argument does con-
tain the implicit conclusion that homosexuality is wrong, it does not vilify homosexuals to the
degree that other positions do. This position is not supported by the psychiatric community. Id.
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1. Condemnation of Homosexuals
Condemnation of homosexuals and/or homosexual behavior is found in
a segment of the religious community. In these circumstances, religion is often
directly used as a justification to condemn homosexuals. 58 Related to this per-
spective is the concept of a "homosexual agenda."'' 59 the idea that gay people
desire to destroy traditional society by breaking down institutions such as mar-
riage, family, and education. 60 As described by Justice Scalia in his Lawrence
dissent: "Today's opinion is the product of a Court, . . . that has largely signed
on to the so-called homosexual agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted
by some homosexual activists directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that
has traditionally attached to homosexual conduct."' 6' Primarily, these argu-
ments involve vilifying or demonizing homosexuals and homosexual conduct,
often by comparing it to deviant sexual behavior. 1
62
In justifying this condemnation of others' behavior, ancient roots, tradi-
tion, and religion are often cited: "Decision of individuals relating to homosex-
ual conduct have been subject to state intervention throughout the history of
Western civilization. Condemnation of those practices is firmly rooted in
Judeao-Christian [sic] moral and ethical standards.' 63  These Supreme Court
justifications that support condemnation (or judgment) provide remarkably little
rationale behind these condemnations, simply proclaiming: "[p]roscriptions
against that conduct have ancient roots. ' ' 64
2. Rebutting Morality and Condemnation
Alluded to earlier, the point of relying on morality is expounded upon in
Lawrence. In both Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion, words are found that elaborate on the Court's tendency to
view pure moral disapproval with skepticism. 165 Justice Kennedy explores this
point in detail in discussing the court's use of morality in Bowers:
158 See Becker, supra note 156, at 221-22.
159 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
160 See Dent, supra note 155, at 616-17.
161 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162 See Dent, supra note 155, at 637. Seemingly taking Justice Scalia's lead, prominent Sena-
tor Rick Santorum reflects the claim: "If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to con-
sensual (gay) sex within your home, then you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to
polygamy, you have the right to incest, you have the right to adultery. You have the right to any-
thing." Sean Loughlin, Santorum Under Fire for Comments on Homosexuality,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/04/22/santorum.gays/index.html (last visited Jan. 31,
2005).
163 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
164 Id. at 192.
165 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571, 582 (2003).
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It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers
was making the broader point that for centuries there have been
powerful voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral.
The condemnation has been shaped by religious beliefs, con-
ceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the
traditional family.... These considerations do not answer the
question before us, however.166
Justice O'Connor sharply criticizes the use of moral disapproval in stat-
ing: "[W]e have never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted
state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to jus-
tify a law that discriminates among groups of persons."'167 Additionally, in re-
ducing the opponent's argument to pure moral disapproval, the court implicitly
erodes at rationality review. Clearly, same-sex marriage was on Justice
O'Connor's mind when she wrote these words as she later specifies that reasons
other than moral disapproval exist to promote the institution of marriage - albeit
without specifying those reasons. 168 Nevertheless, O'Connor's digression is a
revealing view of the Court's thinking on this matter and supports the view that
pure moral disapproval is not a legitimate reason to withhold rights.1
69
B. Legitimate State Interests
Due to the Court's disfavor of pure moral disapproval as a state interest,
secular justifications are needed to oppose same-sex marriage. The following
rebuts more widely used interests that are less suspect than pure moral disap-
proval.
1. Procreation
The state interest of procreation has often been cited as an interest to
justify same-sex marriage bans. 170 However, the state interest of procreation in
marriage has dwindled significantly over the years as the concept of marriage
has evolved.
166 Id. at 571.
167 Id. at 582.
168 Id. at 585.
169 Id. at 599. In his dissent, Justice Scalia again decries the majority opinion: "This effec-
tively decrees the end of all morals legislation." Id. In stating this, Justice Scalia claims that using
the court's rationale, laws against "fornication, bigamy, adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and ob-
scenity" would not withstand rationality review. Id.
170 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. Ver-
mont. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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First of all, procreation is not a requirement in marriage, and the emer-
gence of contraceptives has given couples further control over procreation. 17'
Secondly, adoption, artificial insemination, surrogate parents, and other non-
traditional means provide the same ends of having a son or daughter. 72 These
advances also allow same-sex couples to procreate. None of these alternatives,
which are widely used by heterosexual couples, are generally regarded as dimin-
ishing the legitimacy of a marriage. 173 Essentially, arguing that the purpose of
marriage is for procreation denigrates the marriages of straight couples who
choose not to, or cannot, have children.
Additionally, perhaps in part because of the aforementioned changes in
marriage, the concept of marriage has shifted from property-oriented and child-
oriented to love and commitment oriented. 174 These changes have de-
emphasized the procreation role in marriage. Simply, the state interest in pro-
creation as being the foundation of the institution of marriage has fallen into
disfavor over the years. More specifically, procreation has not been a legitimate
enough interest for denying marriage in multiple cases. 
175
Examples of the court endorsing the love and commitment purpose of
marriage over the procreation function of marriage are plentiful. 176 When di-
rectly confronting the issue of what marriage means, the Griswold court gave
the following surprising 1957 definition of marriage:
Marriage is the coming together for better or worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an as-
sociation that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.
77
In sum, the technological, societal, and legal advances over the last cen-
tury show that procreation surely is a function of marriage, but is no longer re-
garded as an essential part of marriage. Simply, "[t]he law extends the benefits
and protections of marriage to many persons with no logical connection to the
stated governmental goal [of procreation].' 78 For this reason, procreation is
essentially no longer as legitimate of a state interest as it was in the past.
171 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
172 See Silverman, supra note 50, at 424.
173 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 961; Baker, 744 A.2d at 882.
174 See Hamilton, supra note 128, at 336.
175 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Turner, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Baker, 744 A.2d at
217; Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). Implicit in their holdings, these cases all rejected
the procreation argument to a certain degree.
176 Id.
177 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
178 Baker, 744 A.2d at 217.
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The state interest of child rearing is perhaps the most legitimate of them
all. It reinforces the family unit, and the state has an undisputed interest in pro-
viding an "optimal" setting for the welfare of children. 179 However, upon fur7
ther investigation, it becomes apparent that this legitimate state interest is not
rationally served by banning same-sex marriage.
In fact, children's interests are actually hurt by preventing same-sex
marriage. Because of the vast amount of evidence that supports this position,
this argument is fully explored in the policy section of the paper, 180 and as such,
it is pertinent here to only point out that children of same-sex unions are the
ones who suffer by the state's position. The end result of using child-rearing as
a justification for prohibiting same-sex marriage reaches the opposite conclu-
sion: protecting children is a reason to legalize same-sex marriage.
C. Democratic Theory
Perhaps the most logical of the anti-gay rights approaches to the issue
relies more on democratic theory than constitutional text. In fact, this approach
to democracy often directly conflicts with constitutional text. This position,
which represents one variation of democratic theory, advocates that the majority
rules, and that traditions and mores can only be changed by the political process,
not through the courts.
18'
A revealing look at this approach is often reflected in Justice Scalia's
opinions: "[P]ersuading one's fellow citizens is one thing, and imposing one's
views in absence of democratic majority will is something else. I would no
more require a State to criminalize homosexual acts - or for that matter, display
any moral disapprobation of them - than I would forbid it to do so. ' 182 Accord-
ing to this methodology, the democratic process is the only engine for change,
judicial restraint is the policy, and the will of the people prevails in all circum-
stances.
179 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962. See also Dent, supra note 155, at 594.
180 See infra notes 188-227 and accompanying text.
181 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603-04 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is the
premise of our system that those judgments be made by the people, and not a governing caste that
knows best.").
182 Id. at 603 (Scalia, J., dissenting). An out of court statement attributed to Justice Scalia
reads: "I believe in liberal democracy, which is a democracy that worries about the tyranny of the
majority, but it is the majority itself that must draw the lines." See Scalia Slaps 'Abstract Moraliz-
ing,' CBS NEWS (Sept. 29, 2004), http://www.cbsnews.comstories/2004/09/29/national/
main646403.shtnl; Scalia: Some Judges Displaying Too Much Power, LAW.coM (Sept. 30, 2004)
http://www.law.conjsp /article.jsp?id=1096473910932. In a system like this, it is unclear what
recourse, if any, the minority has.
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The fallacy of this argument can be summed up in five words: "the tyr-
anny of the majority.' ' 183 The fact that our country is not an absolute democ-
racy,' 84 and that many safeguards exist against the tyranny of the majority indi-
cate that even the founders did not subscribe to this approach. For example, the
Electoral College, representative government, filibusters, and, most importantly,
the Bill of Rights exist to show that the will of the people is to be the prominent
guiding force, but not the controlling mechanism in each and every instance.
Unambiguous Supreme Court comment on the matter reveals:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to estab-
lish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's
right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights
may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.1
85
Therefore, many issues are not to be trusted with Congress or state leg-
islatures. Protecting the minority from unfair treatment from the majority has
been a theme throughout American history, and unequal treatment of homosex-
ual couples fits within this category. 186 Far too much circumstantial evidence
exists showing that social change is not to be left solely to the will of the peo-
ple.
187
Additionally, it shall be noted that even at its core, this majoritarian per-
spective is not even a real argument against gay rights, rather it is based upon
the righteousness of the majority, and restraint in the judiciary. This ideological
approach even theoretically embraces the notion of gay rights to an extent in
that when the majority approves of it, the people have spoken, and that is to be
the law. To endorse a rigid "might makes right" approach to social and legal
policy not only ignores the purpose of the framers in drafting the Constitution,
but also oversimplifies the complex type of government this country has: repre-
sentative democracy.
183 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 113 (Richard Heffner ed., Penguin
Books 1984) (1835). The "tyranny of the majority" is a phrase famously used by French political
scientist Alexis De Tocqueville in describing possible downfalls of American democracy. Id.
184 Absolute democracy is unlimited power of the majority. See Manuel Cereijo, An Absolute
Democracy?, http://www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org/oagmcl66.php (last visited Sept. 25,
2005).
185 W. Va. State. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
186 In the Supreme Court, the leading example is protecting minorities from racial discrimina-
tion. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
187 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 638.
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In summarizing several opposing arguments to same-sex unions, the ac-
tual legitimate state interests cited by opponents to same-sex unions are ulti-
mately not advanced by a policy of banning legal recognition. Other legitimate
state interests that are discussed in Policy Section VI include economic princi-
ples and further family protection. Because most of the legitimate state interests
actually work against bans, and the ones that do not (morality, procreation) are
arguably not legitimate, these laws might have a hard time withstanding ration-
ality review.
VI. PUBLIC POLICY ANALYSIS
Solely focusing on the courtroom ignores the driving force behind the
laws: sound policy. This portion of the Article examines the other side of the
equation that shapes opinions and often can be even more influential than what
the Constitution says.
One reason this Article explores public policy is the reality that these
arguments can drive change by legislature. It is important to remember the risk
that is run by achieving change through the courts rather than the legislature.
There is a "pragmatic fear that too rapid a march toward marriage equality will
engender a popular backlash."'' 88 Because of this, change via the legislature is
all the more important for validation and sustainability. 189 In sum, compelling
policy reasons for equal rights are significant because they obtain the optimal
outcome - change by the legislature, through the will of the people.
A. Synopsis of America's Current Acceptance Level
Before presenting the numerous policy reasons for accepting gay rights,
a brief summation of America's general acceptance level is helpful. The Elec-
tion 2004 nationwide exit polls revealed fresh information about where that
level stands: 190
Preferred Policy Legally Marry Civil Unions I No Legal Recognition
Percentage 25% 35% 37%
Even though only a quarter of Americans support same-sex marriage,
and the largest choice selected was "no legal recognition," there is reason for
optimism on the part of same-sex couples and equal rights advocates alike. A
188 See Harvard Law Association, supra note 10, at 2011. This type of phenomenon arguably
occurred in both Alaska and Hawaii. Id.
189 Additionally, using policy reasons as a basis to shift the will of the people to more compas-
sionate stances towards others would render the current legal battles moot because of the domino
effect that this would have in changing the laws.
190 CNN.com Election 2004 Exit Polls, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/ 2004/pages/results/
states/US/P/00/epolls.0.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2005).
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total of sixty percent of Americans believe in at least a variation of rights for
same-sex couples.1 91 This indicates that even people who might think that ho-
mosexuality is immoral see the practical, compassionate, and pragmatic reasons
to provide basic protection. Essentially, this dissonance is between peoples'
desire to embrace equality and people's desire to comply with certain religious
tenets. However, through this conflict there is common ground.
192
Regardless of this conflict within America, this and other evidence
shows that overall social tolerance has increased over the past quarter century. 1
93
One would expect this trend to continue if, as widely speculated, the gay rights
movement mirrors other movements towards equal rights. Nevertheless, while
tolerance has increased, social and legal acceptance has largely eluded homo-
sexuals. What seems to be most pertinent to keep the country moving towards
equality is to focus on the sixty percent who recognize a need to provide rights
to same-sex couples.
B. An Overview of the Compelling Policy Reasons for Acceptance
1. Protecting Children and Families
Alluded to earlier, the argument that legal acceptance of homosexual
couples protects children and thus, families, is perhaps the most persuasive be-
cause it directly counters a legitimate interest cited by opponents of equal rights:
child rearing. 194 Once that argument is nullified, the denial of rights is not capa-
ble of withstanding rationality review. ' 5 Many consider this well-documented
policy argument' 96 to be the one with the greatest legs because it appeals to so-
ciety's desire to provide for children.1
97
One side to this position is from the perspective of a child in a same-sex
adult household, a position over which the child has no control. 98 As children
in a same-sex adult household, they are the innocent victims of a system that
191 Id.
192 See infra Section VII.
193 See supra notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
194 See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. Vermont,
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
195 See Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 962-65. The Massachusetts Supreme Court reached this
conclusion in Goodridge. Id.
196 Extensive law review articles about this particular subject go back decades. In fact, a well
written Article from the West Virginia Law Review back in 1999 covered this issue in detail,
accurately predicting the importance of the issue of protecting children in the years to come. See
Silverman, supra note 50.
197 Id. at 411.
198 Id. at 424-429. This usually occurs in one of three ways: 1) one partner is a biological
parent to the child; 2) a parent receives custody through adoption; and 3) deliberate attempts by
the partners to create a child including artificial insemination and surrogate parenting. Id.
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will not allow legal recognition of their parents. Although a handful of states
allow same-sex parents to obtain joint guardianship through adoption, this proc-
ess is typically problematic for the legal guardian. 199 The child's status as vic-




* Uncertainty of custody upon death of the legal parent
2°1
* Tax benefits a°2 and other government benefits
203
* Employer (fringe) benefits
2°4






Simply, it is the children who suffer as a result of their parents' inability
to be legally married. Children should not bear the burden of legal discrimina-
tion against same-sex couples.20 7 The state's legitimate interest in providing a
stable home to raise children is a reason to allow same-sex marriages, not pro-
hibit them.20 8 Indeed, the perspective of the child of a same-sex union is enough
to fail rationality review in and of itself. This argument has proved persuasive
in the courts in both the Massachusetts and Vermont Supreme Court opinions
that require legal recognition of same-sex unions.a°
199 Id. at 429. The availability of these alternative means varies from state to state, and it does
not even approach affording children all of the rights they would receive if their parents were
married.
200 Id. at 429.
201 Id. at 430. "If the biological [parent] should die or become incapacitated due to a debilitat-
ing illness, the child's relationship with the non-biological parent or parents, who may be the only
other parent(s) the child has ever known, may be severed at the discretion of an unsympathetic
judge. The narrow definition of family that refuses to legally recognize the emotional bond be-
tween the child and non-biological parent gives no protection to the relationship." Id.
202 Id. at 436. The trickle down effect of their parents' ability to file taxes has an economic
effect on the child. Id.
203 Id. at 441.
204 Id. at 443. As just one example of many, when a public safety officer dies in the line of
duty, the Bureau of Justice Assistance pays $100,000 to the surviving family. However, the sur-
viving family does not include the same-sex mate or the non-biological child of the deceased. Id.
205 Id. at 447-48.
206 In refusing to recognize the child's family unit, the state is arguably subjecting that child to
ridicule and hardship.
207 See Silverman, supra note 50, at 457.
208 Id.
209 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 962-63 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. Ver-
mont, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
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2. Religious Arguments
Although a pure religious argument has been determined not to be a le-
gitimate justification for a law,21 ° its effect on the general public can be pro-
found.2 ' Christianity will be the subject of the analysis in this subsection due to
its presence in American society.21 2
There is no need to provide all of the religious arguments for gay rights
in detail, for that is to be left up to the religious scholars, and arguably does not
deserve more than this brief divulgence in a legal journal. What is more impor-
tant is to indicate that textual religious arguments supporting acceptance of ho-
mosexuality exist in abundance.2t 3 Several churches have embraced this posi-
tion by beginning to make acceptance of homosexuality (rather than condemna-
tion) more of a priority.2 t4 Some denominations have gone further than others
in accepting homosexuals. 215 Simply, there is plenty of room in religion for
spirituality and acceptance of same-sex unions to co-exist.
210 See supra notes 132-44 and accompanying text.
211 See CNN.com Election 2004 Exit Polls, supra note 190. Fifty-six percent of 2004 voters
indicate that they attend church at least monthly, whereas only fifteen percent indicated that they
never attend church. Id.
212 Id. Eighty-one percent of 2004 voters identified themselves as Christian. Id.
213 MARY E. SWIGONSKI, FROM HATE.CRIMES TO HUMAN RIGHTS 34 (2001). Six prominent
passages exist in the Bible that explicitly condemn homosexuality (far less than the number of
passages that condemn divorce or support a subordinate role for women, for that matter). Id.
Additionally, there are numerous passages in the Bible that describe same-sex relationships in a
positive light. Specifically, scripture describing the love between two women has been co-opted
for use in religious marriage ceremonies. Id. at 40 (citing Ruth 1:16-17). Additionally, it is im-
portant to remember that in the past, ft., vent religious arguments have been used to support slav-
ery, women's oppression, mixed race marriages, and prohibition, among other causes. History
demonstrates that meanings ascribed to scripture change over time. Id.
An example of a broader argument is the historical and biblical role of Jesus as a champion
for the oppressed. History and scripture shows that Jesus fought against the laws of his day that
forbade certain classes of people from worshiping in a temple (these classes included outcasts,
lepers, etc.). Jesus: The Mission, (Discovery Channel broadcast Feb. 12, 2005). This comparison
is not being made to suggest that homosexuals are the social equivalent, only that Jesus had a
compassionate message that embraced people traditionally shunned by the establishment.
214 See Wikipedia, the Free Encyclopedia, Same-Sex Marriage,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Same-sex-marriage (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). Significant head-
way has been made with certain sects of Christianity in the direction of equal rights for same-sex
couples, albeit with bitter divisions. Specifically, the Presbyterian Church has seen bitter divides
develop in recent years. Id. Not only has there been progress in Christian sects, but also in Juda-
ism, where Reform Judaism supports gay marriage and gay clergy. The United Church of Christ
and Reform Judaism remain the highest profile examples of unequivocal acceptance of same-sex
marriage and homosexuality in the religious sector. Id.
215 See U.S. Networks Reject Church Gay Ad, Dec. 1, 2004,
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/12/01/us.church.adban/index.html (last visited Sept.
25, 2005). Perhaps most well known, the United Church of Christ (a church with Puritan roots)
has most openly invited homosexuals to the church in a controversial television commercial that
was banned from network television. In the commercial, the church showed various classes of
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The Law and Economics ("L&E") school of thought sends mixed sig-
nals in its analysis of same-sex marriage.216 Although traditionally this school
strives to be amoral in its analysis, morality often seems capable of factoring
into the equation nonetheless.2 7 Despite this confusion, sound L&E arguments
have emerged over the years that strongly support same-sex marriage.21 8
One logical L&E argument operates on the widely accepted premise
that contracts represent an efficient way for parties to form and maintain inti-
mate relationships. 219 Since a key L&E mantra states "'the law is efficient or
tends toward efficiency," , 220 society should embrace the creation of these con-
tractual unions. 221 Certainly, prohibiting them does not comport with this em-
phasis on efficiency.
The logical extension of the L&E efficiency platform supports expand-
ing contractual access to same-sex couples because not allowing same-sex mar-
riage precludes these couples "from achieving the same degree of utility from
their intimate relationships" as heterosexual couples ca222 This discrimination
relegates homosexual couples seeking to marry "to a perpetual position of sub-
optimal utility maximization and inequality.,
223
The economic consequences are not limited to the particular homosex-
ual couple whom the state denies the right to marry. In fact, all of society suf-
fers as a result of non-utility maximization. 224 Any inefficiency in the machin-
people (including homosexuals) being denied entrance into a church by a bouncer-type figure,
with a voiceover stating: "No matter who you are, or where you are on life's journey, you are
welcome here." Id. Surprisingly, this message was banned from network television (but the
commercial can be viewed at www.stillspeaking.com). In a way, this example of self-imposed
censorship reflects America's grappling with the issue better than any study or political platform.
216 Darren Bush, Moving to the Left by Moving to the Right: A Law and Economics Defense of
Same-Sex Marriage, 22 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 115 (2001).
217 Id. at 132-34. True L&E theory de-emphasizes morality in its cost-benefit analysis.
218 See Bush, supra note 216, at 137; Ryan Nishimoto, Marriage Makes Cents: How Law &
Economics Justifies Same-Sex Marriage, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 379, 390 (2003)
219 See Bush, supra note 216, at 137 ("[T]here are efficiencies in contracts in general and in
marital contracts imparticular."); see also Pouncy, supra note 42, at 367 ("[M]arriage represents
the optimal way to maximize the utility of intimate interpersonal relationships between adults.").
220 See Bush, supra note 216, at 137.
221 See Nishimoto, supra note 218, at 390 (noting that "[pirivate contract is insufficient to gain
the full benefits of marriage.").
222 See Pouncy, supra note 42, at 367; see also Bush, supra note 216, at 137. One expert iden-
tifies the non-existence of intestate succession and adoption/custody processes as particularly high
costs. See also Nishimoto, supra note 218, at 386-88.
223 See Pouncy, supra note 42, at 367; see also Bush, supra note 216, at 137.
224 Several forgone economic benefits include increasing efficiency as a result of improved
psychological conditions; streamlining and pooling of interests; and an increasing purchasing
power. These benefits would enhance economic stability and would create a new industry. See
generally Is Same-Sex Marriage (SSM) a Good or Bad Idea?, http://www.religioustolerance.org
20051
37
Pasfield: Confronting America's Ambivalence towards Same-Sex Marriage: A Le
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2005
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
ery means that the entire system suffers.225 Recognizing same-sex marriage
would encourage efficiency and stability within the economic model.226 These
and other economic arguments227 can be persuasive because they appeal to peo-
ples' sensibilities; it is a solution that is mutually beneficial for all of society.
VII. AN UNEXPLORED COMPROMISE AND A PERMANENT SOLUTION
The "outside the box" approach to the legal issue discussed in this Arti-
cle admittedly has only a minor chance of widespread implementation in the
near future.22 8 This resolution discussed below would have to be self-imposed,
not the result of a court decision. It represents a sensible, rational, and efficient
solution rather than a constitutionally mandated method. Most importantly, it
requires an ever-elusive consensus of the people.
The following principled approach is a take on the concept of separation
of church and state, and combines several of the legal and policy aspects de-
scribed above: for all couples, heterosexual and same-sex, the government
would stop recognizing "marriages" and would start to recognize "unions."
Essentially, this play on words symbolizes an effort to separate the church and
states' roles in "marriage." The significance of this solution lies in acknowledg-
ing the unnecessary entanglement that government-recognized marriage has
created between the church and state.229 It also acknowledges the dualistic na-
ture of unions as having distinct legal and spiritual/emotional components.
This solution represents a compromise because, for the opponents of
same-sex marriage, the state would not vouch for the sanctity of marriage. Con-
versely, for the proponents of same-sex marriage, they would receive all of the
legal rights that heterosexuals do. Essentially, this puts homosexual and hetero-
sexual couples on the same level. In officially dropping the word "marriage,"
all of that word's historical, social, and religious implications would be left to
230the religious/private community.
/hommarint3.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2005). See also Study: Civil Unions a Boon to Connecti-
cut's Budget, http://www.advocate.con/news-detail.asp?id=3265 (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
225 See Bush, supra note 216, at 137. This utilitarian policy seeks wealth maximization for all.
226 See Nishimoto, supra note 218, at 384.
227 An economic benefit that has been noted in pop culture is the increase in commerce for
states that provide same-sex marriages. This concept was even spoofed in a controversial Simp-
sons episode. See Dan Harris, 'The Simpsons' Dives Into Gay Controversy, http://abcnews.go.
con/WNT/Entertainment/story?id=513522&page=l (last visited Sept. 28, 2005).
228 Regrettably, the polar opposites that drive this debate often seem incapable of working
together or agreeing on compromise. The convictions and inflexibility of those engaged in the
battle will prevent otherwise logical solutions from being considered. Nevertheless, this approach
will briefly be explored due to its soundness as a permanent solution.
229 See Taylor, supra note 35, at 191-92. This entanglement has grown as government's role
has expanded. See id.
230 Id. Other unconventional and innovative solutions include changing the government's
recognition of benefits from marriage-based to household-based, and shifting towards a functional
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A. Returning "Marriage" to its Roots, Embracing Religious Freedom, and
Protecting the Integrity of Religion
Yielding the word "marriage" to the religious community in essence re-
turns the word to its origins.23 ' Marriage has been around much longer than
democracy4232 and the opposite sex requirement has its roots in Christianity.
233
Before the state ever got involved in marriage and marriage's role in property
law, the church was the sole vehicle of matrimonial law.234
This solution embraces religious freedom because it does not force any
religions to recognize same-sex marriages if they do not desire to do so. These
are private institutions, and as such, participation is completely voluntary. 35
Participation in the state is by and large involuntary. In other words, those who
do not agree with the treatment of same-sex couples by the church need not par-
ticipate in that institution, or they may seek to reform it. However, unequal
treatment in the government's sphere carries much larger repercussions due to
its compulsory nature.
Refraining from mixing religion and government has directly contrib-
uted to this country's prosperity and success.236 Both government and religion
benefit from being separate, which is evidenced by the success and sustainabil-
ity of a voluntary church. 237 Some religions will eventually recognize same-sex
marriages, and some will not.238 Either way, letting these religions be self-
determinative will only enhance the integrity of their final choices to recognize
these unions. It sends a calming message to religious organizations that flatly
oppose homosexuals: you can feel however you want, and the state will never
force you to recognize same-sex marriage.
This solution also adequately reconciles so many peoples' internal con-
flicts about religion and equality. Instead of feeling as if one is forced to choose
one over the other (equality or religion), this solution allows people to keep both
ideals intact.
approach of welfare. See generally Hamilton, supra note 128. These solutions involve broaden-
ing the government benefits implicit with marriage to other family forms.
231 Taylor, supra note 35, at 175.
232 See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 15-50 (1996).
The origins of marriage go beyond recorded history, and democracy as we know it has only ex-
isted less than 230 years. Id.
233 Hamilton, supra note 128, at 330.
234 Taylor, supra note 35, at 175.
235 As long as one has a social security number, goes to a public school, has a job, purchases
anything, or uses any of the government's services, participation in government is not a choice.
236 Nadine Strossen, Religion and Politics: A Reply to Justice Antonin Scalia, 24 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 427,429 (1997).
237 Id.
238 See supra notes 210-15 and accompanying text (noting that several religions have begun to
accept homosexuality and same-sex couples).
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B. This Solution Hedges "Separate But Equal" Arguments
The solution of yielding the word "marriage" to religious institutions in
favor of "unions" avoids the quandary created by establishing two separate sys-
tems that hope to serve the same purpose. The formation of any separate system
will always be vulnerable to a "separate but equal" attack.239 In fact, the Good-
ridge court provided an advisory opinion holding that the establishment of two
separate systems for heterosexual and same-sex couples is unconstitutional. 240
Theoretically, having two classifications for unions (same-sex versus
heterosexual) that provide identical rights acknowledges nothing. However,
history has shown that the public's perception of this distinction plays a vital
241role. In sum, the constitutionality of such an arrangement of recognizing un-
ions rather than marriages would not be in question, whereas a dual system ap-
proach would be much more constitutionally suspect.
C. A Realistic Assessment of the Solution
After having presented reasons to implement this solution, it is worth
reiterating that this optimal solution, which ensures government neutrality, reli-
gious autonomy, and perhaps most importantly, constitutionality, is an unlikely
scenario in the near future. The prospect of a court decision embracing this sce-
nario is basically non-existent because current Supreme Court case law requires
an ever-elusive religious purpose for invalidation under the Establishment
Clause. 242 Additionally, large-scale self-initiated change in this manner is im-
probable because the opposite sides appear too far apart even to consider a com-
promise. 243 This stand-off reality is perplexing after illustrating the positive
239 Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil Unions Law, Same-
Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)Equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113 (2000); David S. Buckel, Gov-
ernment Affixes a Label of Inferiority on Same-Sex Couples When It Imposes Civil Unions &
Denies Access to Marriage, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 73 (2005).
240 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). By prohibiting a separate system for homosexuals, the court
took the position that a "separate but equal" system is not constitutional. Id. A subsequent advi-
sory opinion on a civil union bill reinforced this conclusion. In re Opinions of the Justices to the
Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004).
241 The perception of the separate systems played a large role in the landmark Brown v. Board
of Education decision. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). However, in a civil union scenario, where a word
distinction is the sole difference, and not the rights provided, a separate but equal argument has
nowhere near as many implications as it did for racial classifications. Separate but equal in terms
of race permeated to almost every aspect of people's lives: education, work, socialization, wor-
ship, etc. Id. The implications in an arrangement for same-sex unions are nowhere near as drastic
since they reach only one institution.
242 See supra notes 132-44 and accompanying text.
243 See Cruz, supra note 7 at 1021. On one hand, many in the religious community would
heavily resist such a move because separation of church and state is not a positive attribute. Addi-
tionally, having the government consider heterosexual and homosexual unions the same is un-
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attributes this solution has for both religion and equality. This compromise lets
both parties save face and embraces/reflects the dualistic nature of this problem.
In spite of its immediate improbability, this option is worthy of exploration be-
cause of its sensibility.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This Article advocates a multi-pronged strategy aimed solely at obtain-
ing equal rights for same-sex couples. By providing this cross-section analysis,
arguments for acceptance emerge which reflect that the sum of the arguments is
far greater than any of their parts. Individually, the practical arguments herein
are all capable of eroding at the marginal headway that has been had by oppo-
nents of equal rights. Collectively, they represent overwhelming evidence that
same-sex couples will eventually find legal acceptance.
The Constitution guarantees equal rights in the Equal Protection Clause,
provides the fundamental right to marry in the Due Process Clause, and ensures
against the legislation of religious principle in the Establishment Clause. These
doctrines found directly in the Constitution serve as the legal basis for obtaining
equal rights for same-sex couples.
However, even more persuasive policy reasons for equal rights are
rooted in social, economic, and moral theory. These sensible justifications are
capable of shifting public opinion towards rights for same-sex couples. In other
words, pragmatic justifications will lead people to the principled conclusions.
With time, equal rights for same-sex couples can become as normal as
the right to privacy, the right to free speech, and the right to vote. In the mean-
time, however, the future remains uncertain. Without providing compelling
support for acceptance in the courtrooms, legislatures, churches, and board-
rooms, same-sex couples and their families will continue to be denied rights that
are unquestionably given to others.
Justin R. Pasfield*
thinkable, and some would even abolish governmental recognition of unions altogether before
putting homosexual and heterosexual relationships on the same legal plane. Id. An example of a
community choosing to give up benefits as opposed to expanding them to other groups occurred
in Jackson, Mississippi during the civil rights era. When faced with a court mandate to integrate
their public pools, the city chose to close them. Id. at 1021-22 (citing Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217, 247 (1971)). Surprisingly, nine years after Brown, the court upheld the pool closing.
Id. A scenario like this for marriage is not as likely because of the benefits of marriage go so
much further than mere pool privileges. Id.
Also, on the side of same-sex marriage, there will inevitably be those that view this possible solu-
tion as not good enough. Some may view this scenario as an appeasement, or just another way of
saying that same-sex couples will never obtain "marriage."
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douglas pond cummings for serving as the author's Article Mentor. Lastly, the author would like
to thank his wife Sarah for her love and support.
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